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DEVELOPING THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN
CONTROLLING LmGATION CONFLICTS:
RESPONSE TO GREEN
Susan R. Martyn*
T HE same day I finished reading Professor Bruce Green's article, I
came across a quote from Emerson in his essay entitled "Illu-
sions." Emerson's words aptly sum up my conscious response to Pro-
fessor Green's ideas.
From day to day the capital facts of human life are hidden from our
eyes. Suddenly the mist rolls up, and reveals them, and we think
how much good time is gone, that might have been saved had any
hint of these things been shown.'
Professor Green has rolled up the mist surrounding disqualification
litigation and has revealed some of the illusion and gap in our current
doctrine. I am specifically intrigued with his idea that personal sanc-
tions might redress conflicts in litigation, especially where courts have
been reluctant to disqualify lawyers and disciplinary agencies have
rarely responded. As Professor Green puts it:
Nor is it appropriate to put the burden of disqualification on clients
to create an incentive for them to avoid the possibility that their
lawyers will violate the conflict rules. It seems axiomatic that law-
yers, not clients, are the appropriate ones to avoid these violations.
Clients not only are far less likely than their lawyers to know the
facts giving rise to an impermissible conflict, but they are also less
likely to know and understand the rules governing litigators' con-
flicts of interests. That is why lawyers have the burden of obtaining
informed consent from their clients and, in some cases, are not al-
lowed to undertake the representation even with client consent 2
This emphasis propels Professor Green's argument in the right di-
rection. As a result, he correctly focuses on what happens to the client
or clients in disqualification cases, rather than on what happens to the
lawyers or their law firms. This also explains why Professor Green
agrees with Professor Ted Schneyer, who sees conflict rules, unlike
most other disciplinary rules, as primarily prophylactic prescriptions.
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Law-
rence Ponoroff, Bruce Green, and David Harris for offering help in thinking through
the ideas in this Article.
1. Ralph W. Emerson, Illusions, in The Oxford Authors: Ralph Waldo Emerson
397, 403 (Richard Poirier ed., 1990).
2. Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 71, 91 (1996) (footnote omitted).
3. Id at 104 (citing Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism:
What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L Rev. 639, 644
(1994)).
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Professor Green also helps solve a partially unraveled enigma in
Professor Wilkins's classification of conflicts issues. He notes that
Wilkins labels conflicts matters as "agency problems," that is, situa-
tions in which lawyer conduct injures clients.4 Green points out that,
from the perspective of the opposing client or former client in litiga-
tion, a lawyer's conflict also can be labeled as an "externality prob-
lem," that is, one that involves lawyers and clients together imposing
harm on third parties or on courts.5
Wilkins points out that disciplinary agencies typically respond best
to agency problems, but poorly to externality problems.6 If conflicts
violations primarily raise agency issues, then disciplinary agencies
should respond effectively. Increasingly, where clients are aware of
conflicts, such as personal conflicts of a lawyer that affect her ability
independently to represent the client, disciplinary agencies are step-
ping up their response.7 In litigation, however, conflicts have been
addressed primarily through disqualification motions to courts, not by
disciplinary bodies. This may be because conflicts in litigation raise
externality issues. As Professor Green points out, this is precisely the
characterization some courts articulate.
If Wilkins is correct that conflicts problems raise primarily agency
issues, then it does not necessarily follow that Professor Green is cor-
rect when he suggests a new remedy-sanctions-to address agency
issues that clients may not refer to disciplinary authorities. Instead,
the answer may lie in providing greater incentives for clients to com-
plain to disciplinary authorities. If, on the other hand, Professor
Green is correct that externality problems are also created by conflicts
matters in litigation, then perhaps he is also correct to suggest an addi-
tional judicial remedy apart from the disciplinary process.
My conscious praise for Professor Green's ideas, however, was soon
undermined by my subconscious response to his article. The morning
after I finished reading his essay, I awoke from a vivid dream, in which
I played the role of a student in a law school class. The professor had
just completed a lecture entitled: "How to Handle Client Conflicts of
Interest in Litigation." I questioned the instructor: "But if we follow
4. Id. at 88 (citing David B. Wiflkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 800, 824-30 (1992)).
5. Id.
6. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 800, 822-
30 (1992).
7. See, e.g., In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753 (Ariz. 1991) (finding suspension appropriate
where attorney did not tell client of potential conflict of interest in purchase of client's
property by corporation owned by attorney); In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1992)
(holding disbarment warranted by attorney's willful misappropriation of client funds);
In re Conway, 301 N.W.2d 253 (Wis. 1981) (holding that litigation representation
against a former client in the same matter warrants public reprimand and payment of
costs of disciplinary proceeding).
8. Green, supra note 2, at 88-89.
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your recommendations we would violate current well accepted con-
flicts or confidentiality rules."
The professor responded: "That is correct."
I continued: "And my client could sue me for legal malpractice."
Once again, the response was: "Correct."
Frustrated, I asked: "But you say we should treat clients like this
despite these risks?"
Again, the answer: "Correct."
"Why?" I asked incredulously.
"Because you won't get caught."
Here lies the core of my subconscious fear. I worry that Professor
Green's call for two separate legal standards, the violation of which
would result in two separate remedies, disqualification and sanctions,
will confuse most lawyers. At the same time, I fear that a few others,
those I might label the "Holmesian Bad Lawyers," will rationally seize
upon Professor Green's proposal as a means to avoid getting caught.
Let me explain. Consider how a rational self-maximizing law firm
might react to the notion that two legal standards now govern conflicts
of interest in litigation. First, they would note that Professor Green
proposes no changes to existing conflicts rules designed to protect
lawyer loyalty and client confidentiality. These rules are designed as a
counterweight to lawyer self-interest; consequently, Professor Green
expects that they should continue to be applied by the lawyer before
he undertakes the representationf This means that existing conflicts
systems in law firms, to the extent they accurately reflect existing con-
flicts rules, should stay in place.
Second, the law firm would note that Professor Green advocates a
change in conflicts doctrine when the conflict issue occurs later, before
a court. Here, he finds the over protection of client interests built into
the conflicts rules inappropriate. Because more than one client will be
affected by the outcome, a new rule that uses remedies less cataclys-
mic than disqualification should seek to protect the interests of cur-
rent clients. The rational law firm therefore realizes that
disqualification becomes less likely should it forget its initial conflicts
check or the disclosure to clients potentially affected by conflicts.
Essentially, Professor Green argues that a court should respond to a
disqualification motion in a bifurcated manner. First, the court would
consider "whether disqualifying the lawyer... is justified in order to
remedy a past harm or avert a future one."'1 If a court grants the
motion, it should be able to articulate some tangible harm to the cur-
rent or former client making the motion. In addition, that harm must
outweigh any harm to the adversary caused by the disqualification it-
self. Tangible harms to the moving client include misuse of client con-
9. Id. at 104-07.
10. Id at 106.
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
fidences and inadequate representation. Tangible harms to the non-
moving client include delay of litigation and the expense of retaining a
new lawyer." The disqualification motion should be granted only
when the misuse of client confidences or actual inadequate represen-
tation occurs or will occur, and only when they would harm the mov-
ing client more than the delay and cost would hurt the non-moving
client.' 2
Absent this excess of tangible harm to the client moving for disqual-
ification, the court should deny the motion. It then should integrate a
disciplinary hearing into the disqualification matter. The second issue
the court considers should be whether the lawyer violated the conflict
rules when she took on the representation.1 3 If an attorney violates
these rules, then a personal economic sanction becomes appropriate,
even though the lawyer is allowed to continue the representation that
violated the same rules. Green argues that personal sanctions are
more direct penalties, more effective deterrents, and more cost-effec-
tive than disqualification motions.' 4 Courts would impose "modest"
sanctions the first time litigators violate conflicts rules and increase
the amount for repeat offenders. 5
Monetary or personal sanctions are designed to fill several gaps in
current conflicts doctrine. In jurisdictions such as the Second Circuit,
which tend to deny disqualification motions in cases where the rules
are violated but no remedy is deemed necessary, personal sanctions
offer an alternative means to redress rules violations that fall short of
disqualification. In jurisdictions such as the Fifth Circuit, which tend
to grant disqualification motions more readily, some disqualification
motions will be replaced by motions for personal sanction. Sanctions
might also become available for rules violations not currently
redressable by disqualification.' 6
Professor Green argues that sanctions should follow both substan-
tive violations of conflicts rules as well as what he describes as "proce-
dural requirements," such as law firm screens.' 7 The latter are best
illustrated by court rules that allow law firms to wall off a lawyer
tainted by a conflict from all participation in the case. The minority of
jurisdictions allow screening provisions, intended as a means of avoid-
ing disqualification by preventing actual harm, such as the use of con-
fidential information, to the client.
11. Id. at 106-07.
12. Professor Nathan Crystal earlier reached a similar conclusion. See Nathan M.
Crystal, Disqualification of Counsel for Unrelated Matter Conflicts of Interest, 4 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 273 (1990).
13. Green, supra note 2, at 109-10.
14. Id. at 93-94.
15. Id. at 97.
16. Id at 95-97.
17. Id. at 117-19.
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Professor Green rightly points out that these courts insufficiently
protect clients against their own lawyer's conduct."8 He therefore
seems to reject the view that screens can serve as an adequate alterna-
tive remedy for conflicts violations. I agree with this analysis.' 9 He
analogizes the purpose of screens to the substantive rules intended to
prevent conflicts. "Self-interested lawyers" he argues, "cannot be
trusted to assess fairly the likely significance or insignificance of con-
fidential client information .. . [or] the adequacy of screening pro-
cedures."2 Absent client consent, therefore, violation of the sub-
stantive rules occurs even with a screen, and sanctions should follow,
even when disqualification does not.
Professor Green uses the cases IBM v. Levin Computer Corp.2 '
and, to a lesser extent, In re Leslie Fay Cos.32 to illustrate his propo-
sal. The Third Circuit in Levin disqualified Levin Computer's law
firm because it violated the non-controversial rule that a lawyer can-
not represent a client in a lawsuit against another existing client unless
the latter will not be prejudiced, and both parties consent. 3 Professor
Green does not quibble with this rule. He asks instead what should
have occurred when, five years into the representation of Levin Com-
puter, IBM moved to disqualify.' Green argues that if the court had
found that the law firm's representation of both IBM and Levin Com-
puter had not harmed IBM more than losing counsel after five years
would hurt Levin, then the court should have denied the motion to
disqualify. Why? Because "disqualification would serve no remedial
function."'
Wait. Why did it take five years for either of these clients to dis-
cover the conflict? Obviously, the law firm neither raised it nor
sought consent from both clients, as the rules require. Yet Green ar-
gues that "there is nothing harmful per se in representing one client
against another [client]." 6 At the same time, he also recognizes that
the obligation to obtain client consent is critically important because it
allows the client to assess the extent to which the adverse representa-
tion will represent an act of disloyalty. It also allows the client to
monitor the lawyer, or the screen, more closely should consent be
granted.
It was precisely this opportunity that Levin Computer and IBM
were deprived of by their law firm. Either the firm failed to complete
18. See id. at 119.
19. See Susan R. Martyn, Visions of the Eternal Law Firnm The Future of Law
Firm Screens, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 937 (1994).
20. Green, supra note 2, at 122.
21. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
22. 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
23. Levin, 579 F.2d at 274-75.
24. Green, supra note 2, at 84-85.
25. Id- at 85.
26. I& at 105.
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an adequate conflicts check or failed to inform the clients of the po-
tential problem as the rules required. Yet Green contends that, ap-
plying his new bifurcated standard, "a court in a case like Levin
almost certainly should allow [the law firm] to continue the represen-
tation." 7 This follows because, even if IBM could prove harm, which
seems unlikely, this harm would fall far short of the cost to Levin
Computer of having to obtain new counsel to replace five years of
work.28
Professor Green is on to something here, but in searching for its
meaning he may have opened the wrong door. By focusing on ade-
quate client protections against lawyer resolution of conflicts, he cor-
rectly estimates the need for additional client remedies. Serving this
need does not necessarily mean disparaging the disqualification rem-
edy, however.
Consider once again how a rational lawyer might respond to this
change in the law. First, she knows that the chance of disqualification
will be no greater and probably will decline following the implementa-
tion of Green's bifurcated doctrine. Second, she knows that the viola-
tion of some conflicts rules, which currently result in disqualification,
could result in personal sanctions instead. This rational lawyer also
knows that the amount of personal sanctions will be a function of how
often she or her law firm have been caught in the past. Beyond that,
Professor Green gives her little guidance about what standard governs
the amount of the sanction.
The lawyer or law firm therefore may see an opportunity: a chance
to create new legal standards governing sanctions for conflicts. This
law, he will argue, should nuance the conflicts rules so that only real
client harm and bad lawyer motive is redressed. He will analogize, as
Professor Green has taught him, both to Rule 1129 and disciplinary
sanctions,30 where these factors reign supreme. In situations when cli-
ents are unable to prove harm or bad motive, the attorney would re-
ceive nominal sanctions, while clients who can show either would get
more significant sanctions. How much more? That, he will argue, also
should be determined by the harm caused by the firm's violation.
27. Id at 113.
28. Professor Green agrees with Professor Crystal's conclusion regarding this case.
Green, supra note 2, at 108 n.147; see Crystal, supra note 12, at 313 (stating disqualifi-
cation in Levin was unwarranted since the risk of taint was low and the costs were
high).
29. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) provides that sanctions "shall be lim-
ited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
30. The Preface to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions indicates
that the drafters consider three factors important: "the ethical duty and to whom it is
owed," "the lawyer's mental state," and "the amount of injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Preface B (1992).
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This means that my dream-based fears may have come true. Law-
yers in Professor Green's world will worry far less about disqualifica-
tion and will have a window of legal opportunity to argue their way
out of severe economic sanctions. The rational lawyer willing to cal-
culate risk will have greater incentives to undertake proposed employ-
ment that violates conflicts rules. The same lawyer also may
purposely avoid learning whether the rules are violated by ignoring
conflicts checks in the law firm. Lawyers and law firms in general may
take on new matters and more often ignore conflicts rules. Ulti-
mately, as long as the client will generate large fees that will eventu-
ally outweigh the chance and amount of later economic sanctions,
taking a case without a conflicts search may be more cost effective.
Currently, law firms that assess future fees where potential conflicts
surface must weigh two main risks: the risk of being caught multiplied
by the risk of disqualification. These rules provide a less than ade-
quate remedy to the non-moving client and a semi-adequate remedy
to the moving client. Green's alternative makes lawyers weigh a pro-
posed client fee against the risk of being caught times two factors: a
greatly reduced risk of disqualification plus an unknown but perhaps
manageable risk of sanctions. This proposed change confuses conflicts
law, dilutes its deterrence potential, and fails to provide an adequate
remedy to both the moving and non-moving clients. Professor
Green's insistence on tangible harm weakens his call for a new rem-
edy, because it fails to take seriously both the opportunity lost by the
client or clients to evaluate the potential conflict and the ability to
monitor the potential conflict if consent is given.
A better answer is provided by Leslie Fay, a recent bankruptcy
case. 31 Professor Green cites this case as an example of the kind of
personal sanctions he envisions as an alternative to disqualification. 3
He fails, however, to give full meaning to both the reasoning and the
result of an excellent decision. The reasoning of Judge Brozman in
Leslie Fay helps to clarify Professor Green's problem with current dis-
qualification law and also provides a more precise answer to his search
for an alternative remedy. The result comes in the form of the old-
fashioned remedy of fee forfeiture authorized in statutory form by
the Bankruptcy Code.3 3
In Leslie Fay, the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges ("Weil")
faced a conflict similar to that ignored by the law firm of Carpenter,
Bennett in Levin. Weil initially represented an internal audit commit-
tee designed to identify management participation in fraudulent en-
tries in Leslie Fay's general ledger. Before these investigations were
complete, Weil expanded its role to representing management in filing
for bankruptcy reorganization. Applicable bankruptcy rules, like the
31. In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
32. Green, supra note 2, at 94 n.99.
33. Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 539 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 328 (1994)).
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general conflicts rules applied in Levin, required the firm to disclose
its relationships to any party in interest other than the debtor. 4 At
the time of its approval as counsel to the debtor, Weil failed to dis-
close several of its relevant professional relationships, including: si-
multaneous representation of two members of the Audit Committee;
Leslie Fay's independent auditor at the time of the fraud; and Leslie
Fay's seventh largest creditor. When these facts later came to light,
the court appointed an examiner to review the lack of disclosure and
its impact on the veracity of the Audit Committee report. During the
course of the investigation, a Wel partner admitted that his firm
would not have sued Leslie Fay's independent auditor "even if the
facts warranted it."'35
The examiner found Well's lack of disclosure to the court inexcus-
able.36 The law firm therefore was not "disinterested" as required by
the Bankruptcy Code.37 In other words, there existed a "fair percep-
tion that because of multiple representations and client relationships,
Weil Gotshal would be unable to act solely in the debtor's best inter-
ests."'38 Despite these conflicts, the examiner found that the debtor
suffered no actual injury, because Weil had represented it in exem-
plary fashion. He therefore recommended disallowance of the law
firm's fees rather than disqualification.
Judge Brozman generally accepted this recommendation, but en-
larged both its remedy and its rationale. She began by identifying the
source of the disclosure and disinterestedness requirement in the
Bankruptcy Code as "concern with the proper attention to fiduciary
obligation[s]. ' '39 She then concluded that the firm was not "disinter-
ested" because some of its interests were "materially adverse" to
those of the bankrupt estate.40 After reviewing the relevant case law,
she defined actual conflicts as those which affect the representation,
and potential conflicts as those which create a reasonable perception
of meaningful incentive to act contrary to the best interests of the es-
tate. She pointed out that both types of conflicts trigger the need for
disclosure. These are to be distinguished from "hypothetical or theo-
retical" conflicts, which raise the possibility of clashing interests but
are unlikely to occur.41
34. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 requires disclosure in professional employment to the
bankruptcy court of "the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other
party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee,
or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee." Fed. R. Bankr. P.
2014(a).
35. Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 535.
36. Iat
37. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1994).
38. Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 531.
39. Id. at 532.
40. IM at 531-32 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1994)).
41. Id at 532.
[Vol. 65
RESPONSE TO GREEN
These categories parallel those that Professor Green would have us
impose on current conflicts rules. Actual conflicts, he argues, gener-
ate actual harm; all other conflicts call for sanction. He does not
clearly distinguish, however, between potential conflicts, where the
motive or opportunity to breach fiduciary duty exists, and hypotheti-
cal conflicts where little or no motive or opportunity are apparent. I
agree with Judge Brozman that true hypothetical conflicts do not trig-
ger disclosure obligations.42 Potential conflicts, on the other hand, call
for both disclosure and client consent. Professor Green agrees with
this conclusion but fails to follow it through to its logical consequence.
When there is neither disclosure by the law firm nor consent by the
party to a potential conflict, a breach of fiduciary duty occurs; the per-
son in the position to evaluate the impact of the potential conflict has
been deprived of the opportunity or the right to control the subse-
quent representation.
Weil's conduct in Leslie Fay precisely illustrates this point. The law
firm unilaterally breached its fiduciary duty by exclusively reserving
the role of investigating potential targets of the Audit Committee,
while simultaneously representing some of those interests in the same
and other matters. This deprived the debtors and the court of an "un-
biased investigation of the facts,"43 requiring a subsequent, lengthy
investigation by a new committee and counsel." If Weil had disclosed
the conflict when required to do so, the court would have appointed
an independent examiner to complete the Audit Committee investiga-
tion, allowing Well to remain as counsel to the debtor.45
Despite these breaches of fiduciary duty, Judge Brozman responded
to the examiner's finding of no actual harm to the debtor, in addition
to the "financial burdens to Leslie Fay of remaining in chapter 11" by
finding that both outweighed the need to redress the undisclosed con-
flicts by complete disqualification.4 6 She therefore permitted Weil to
complete existing matters necessary for the reorganization. She dis-
qualified the firm, however, from handling new matters and instructed
it to refrain from charging any fees for providing background to new
42. Courts and commentators have referred to hypothetical conflicts as "the ap-
pearance of impropriety," borrowing the language of Canon 9 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Most agree that the standard should not be used
in conflicts cases. See; e.g., Crystal, supra note 12, at 286-90 (arguing that disqualifica-
tion is only appropriate if there is a substantial risk of trial tainting because disqualifi-
cation imposes costs on both the client and the court system); Nancy J. Moore,
Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Pro-
posed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211,227-28
(1982) (arguing that the appearance of impropriety standard impinges on legitimate
client interests and is inconsistent with current practice).
43. Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 535.
44. 1d at 533-36.
45. Id. at 537-38.
46. Id at 538.
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counsel.47 She further imposed an economic sanction on Weil, in the
form of "disgorgement of the costs, direct and indirect, of both of the
examiner's investigations and of the failure to disclose."4 8 Weil re-
tained its fees for the Audit Committee investigation because an in-
vestigation would have been necessary for Leslie Fay's reorganization.
Leslie Fay teaches that potential conflicts, even when they do not
ripen into actual conflicts, nevertheless can cause actual harm.
Though the court-appointed examiner eventually found that the Audit
Committee's work was untainted by Weil's potential conflicts, the very
real, and admitted, motive and opportunity to favor interests other
than those of the debtor remained a viable possibility. The only way
to discern whether these conflicts caused harm to Leslie Fay49 was to
duplicate the earlier investigation with independent counsel. This in-
vestigation cost a great deal of time and money, which the court found
to constitute actual harm to the client.50
Professor Green too easily dismisses potential conflicts, such as
those in Leslie Fay and Levin, as "intangible" harms, redressable by
sanctions but not by disqualification. 51 Leslie Fay demonstrates that
potential conflicts warrant both disqualification as well as sanctions.
It also illustrates that intangible harm becomes tangible during the
process of ascertaining whether any harm has been caused by the con-
flict. Finally, even if no tangible harm has occurred, Leslie Fay cor-
rectly placed the costs of that discovery on the lawyer or law firm who
prevented the investigation, and who had control of the conflict in the
first place.
In a more recent case, In re Bonneville Pacific Corp.,52 a trustee,
appointed after the first lawyer for the debtor was disqualified and
denied compensation, recovered an additional $141 million for the
debtor, part of which came from professionals and insiders formerly
represented by the disqualified lawyer. When the lawyer sought his
fees, the court reiterated its denial of all compensation, writing a ex-
tensive opinion that detailed the lawyer's fiduciary lapses. The court
adopted a bright line rule: "professionals who violate their fundamen-
tal ethical obligations to the estates do not provide 'valuable services'
to those same estates. '53
Leslie Fay and Bonneville Pacific therefore return us to the original
purpose of conflicts rules, and simultaneously provide another more
47. Id at 539.
48. It These costs included at least $800,000 incurred by the examiner and his
staff as well as "those incurred by the Committees in dealing with Well's relationships
and its disqualification or retention." Id.
49. An example of harm would be failing to identify one or more potentially liable
parties.
50. Leslie Fay, 175 B.R. at 539.
51. Green, supra note 2, at 97.
52. 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
53. Id. at 887-88.
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flexible remedy-a goal that Professor Green applauds. The courts
do not, however, create a bifurcated substantive conflicts standard to
achieve this result. Instead, both judges recognize that the real con-
cern behind conflicts rules is a client assessment of whether an actual
or potential conflict will harm the interests of the client, whether tan-
gible or intangible. This is why all conflicts rules require client notifi-
cation of the conflict and why most allow for client consent to the
conflict.
Empowered by these insights, we now can address the current gap
in conflicts doctrine that Professor Green so conveniently calls to our
attention. I suggest two changes to his proposal that I believe will
better protect clients, deter lawyer misconduct, and clearly add an ad-
ditional, readily available remedy.
First, I would hesitate to bifurcate the conflicts standard that courts
apply. As Leslie Fay illustrates, conflicts rules derive from long stand-
ing fiduciary principles embodied in the law of agency. Further, dis-
tinguishing between actual and potential conflicts in terms of
substantive outcome ignores the discovery cost of later investigation.
Finally, lawyers and law firms are just beginning to come to grips with
the meaning of these rules in a wide variety of cases. They are finally
organizing their law firm conflicts checks to take these rules into ac-
count.54 Inserting a new legal standard into the mix risks confusion at
the very least. Unfortunately, a new standard also offers opportunity
for obfuscation of important lawyer obligations. A unitary standard is
essential because disclosure allows clients to retain control over law-
yer conduct. Professor Green is correct in suggesting an additional
remedy, as long as uniform conflicts rules continue to operate.
Second, I suggest refraining Professor Green's suggested standard
for sanctions. Focusing on fee-forfeiture cases rather than Rule 11 or
disciplinary sanctions more adequately addresses the issues faced by
all parties.55 When disqualification is called for by the conflicts rules,
as in Leslie Fay and Bonneville Pacific, sanctions would automatically
follow in the form of fee-forfeiture. The amount would be calculated
by determining the sum necessary to restore both the moving and the
non-moving client to the status quo.5 6
54. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Implementing a Conflicts Control System, 40 Prac.
Law., Apr. 1994, at 15 (stating that lawyers and law firms need to establish, maintain,
and continually update conflicts information systems).
55. After I completed this Response I belatedly discovered that Professor Crystal
had previously made this analysis. See Crystal, supra note 12, at 311-12.
56. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) does allow a sanction to include
"some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). To this extent, I agree with Professor
Green's analogy to Rule 11 sanctions. I prefer, however, the rich texture of the fee-
forfeiture cases over the rather vague sufficiency of deterrence standard under Rule
11.
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There are several possible ways to tally this amount. In cases in
which disclosure has not occurred or been adequate, at least one client
has been deprived of an independent opportunity to assess the risk. 7
By definition, the law firm has breached a fiduciary duty to that client.
It therefore seems fair that the firm or lawyer should bear the burden
of minimizing the amount of the fee refund attributable to the breach.
This can be accomplished by an expensive subsequent examination of
the situation as occurred in Leslie Fay. It also could be approximated
in a more efficient manner, by procedurally placing the costs of expla-
nation on the law firm or lawyer that generated the need for the inves-
tigation. The court in Bonneville Pacific took this route by allowing
the disqualified lawyer subsequent opportunity to prove that he "had
indeed fulfilled his fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of
this estate."58 This can be accomplished by presuming disgorgement
of the entire fee the firm has charged the clients. Absent proof of real
benefit to a client from the firm's past services, the law firm forfeits all
of the fee.
The financial incentive of proving this benefit should rest with the
law firm for two reasons. First, agency law traditionally has provided
for fee disgorgement as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty.59 Sec-
ond, the law firm is the best risk avoider, because it has the best access
to the facts that generate the need for disclosure in the first place.60 It
also has the best access to facts about the cost of subsequent investiga-
tion to prove the value of services that benefited the client.
Of course, in many cases like Levin, where the firm provided serv-
ices over a long period of time, the firm may be able to show real
benefit to one or more clients. Once IBM fired the law firm, for ex-
ample, it was entitled to fee disgorgement. Similarly, once the court
disqualified the firm, Levin Computer also became eligible for a full
refund. If the law firm raised the issue, the court then could consider
the benefit of its past services to either or both former clients. The
lawyer's ability to prove benefit, however, should have been limited to
the amount necessary to bring a new law firm to the same place in
representing the client. If this amount is unclear, a court could escrow
a large enough sum to pay the new firm until its preparation and serv-
ices reach the same point in the pending proceedings. In a situation
like Leslie Fay, where the services may be severable and time is of the
essence, the court can deny the firm future fees and require disgorge-
ment of past amounts attributable to the unreviewed and unresolved
conflict. In a case like Bonneville Pacific, the court can wait, compare
the results of new counsel without a conflict, and uphold its prior
order.
57. In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
58. In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
59. Restatement (First) of Agency §§ 399(k), 456, 469 (1933).
60. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 26-28 (1970).
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Casting an additional remedy in fee-forfeiture terms renews fiduci-
ary incentives for lawyers and cautions them to heed conflicts rules.
Even if we accept Professor Green's proposal for a bifurcated legal
standard, the firm will know that undetected conflicts risk complete
fee disgorgement. The opportunity to argue lack of bad motive or
knowledge evaporates. The law returns to its primary goal of client
protection. It also redresses harm to the non-moving client by grant-
ing the right to seek refund of past fees paid. The refund then can be
used to employ new counsel. Extending this remedy both to the non-
moving and moving client provides a needed remedy and eliminates
the fear some courts share with Professor Green: that granting dis-
qualification motions causes more harm than it avoids.
I am happy to report that this idea is a very old one. Learned Hand
reminds us that it had become commonplace by the beginning of the
seventeenth century for attorneys to refrain from representing con-
flicting interests. The usual consequence of violating this rule was de-
barment "from receiving any fee from either, no matter how
successful his labors."'" Justice Douglas, in commenting that "the in-
cidence of a particular conflict of interest can seldom be measured
with any degree of certainty," also placed the burden of establishing
the value of the fee on the lawyer who breached the fiduciary duty.6'
Even when no damage is identified, a lawyer who labors under a con-
flict of interest should be denied compensation. Douglas believed that
a lower standard would fail to support the legal duty of fiduciaries "at
a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."'
Similarly, the Second Restatement of Agency provides for fee for-
feiture in cases of "willful and deliberate breach of contract."' The
comments explain that a serious violation of a duty of loyalty consti-
tutes a willful and deliberate breach of contract.6s Specifically, the
rule applies to an agent who "acts ... for the benefit of another in
antagonism to or in competition with the principal... even though the
agent believes that his conduct is for the benefit of the principal."'
For example, a real estate broker who exhibits disloyalty by conceal-
ing material information from a seller forfeits the right to all compen-
sation, even if no tangible harm has been demonstrated.67
These ideas are now more specifically applied to lawyers by section
49 of the Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
Partial or Complete Forfeiture of Lawyer's Compensation
61. Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1950).
62. Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941).
63. Id at 269 (citing Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546(N.Y. 1928)).
64. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958).
65. Id. at cmt. b.
66. Id. at cmt. a.
67. Moore & Co. v. T-A-L-L Inc., 792 P.2d 794, 799 (Colo. 1990).
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A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client
may be required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation
for the matter. In determining whether and to what extent forfei-
ture is appropriate, relevant considerations include the gravity and
timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the
lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to
the client, and the adequacy of other remedies.68
Comments to this section mirror those found in the Second Restate-
ment of Agency section 469. For example, a violation of a client duty
is deemed clear "if a reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts
and law reasonably accessible to the lawyer, would have known that
the conduct was wrongful."69 The Reporter's notes provide citations
to cases where this rule has been applied to conflicts violations. The
norm is complete fee forfeiture from the point a law firm has failed to
disclose its representation of the opposing party in other matters. For
example, a lawyer who agreed to represent a current client's wife in a
divorce was prevented from recovering any fee charged the husband
after the lawyer took on the wife's case.7 ° Similarly, in a recent Cali-
fornia case, the court ordered complete fee forfeiture for failure to
obtain the client's consent to a conflict. 71 On the other hand, it ex-
cluded from forfeiture fees paid during the period when no conflict
existed.72 Another court has excluded from fee forfeiture amounts for
services rendered before the lawyer knew or should have known he
would be a witness in the client's case.73
Fee forfeiture differs from the damage remedy of malpractice ac-
tions. In Hendry v. Pelland,74 for example, a lawyer represented five
family members who owned property in negotiating a complex sales
transaction.75 When the deal unraveled, the clients later settled an
unjust enrichment suit brought by a land developer for 1.5 million
based on the lawyer's advice.76 Three of the clients then sued the law-
yer and his law firm for professional negligence and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. The law firm counterclaimed for its fee. The clients were
unable to prove that the lawyer's incompetence or conflict of interest
68. Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 49 (Tentative Draft
1996).
69. Id- at cmt. d.
70. Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373 (Ct. App. 1977); see also In re Eastern
Sugar Antitrust Litig., 697 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that law firm should have
disclosed its merger discussions with opposing counsel to the district court); Rice v.
Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982) (denying compensation to law firm that repre-
sented opposing party's insurance adjuster).
71. Giannini, Chin & Valinoti v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 404-05 (Ct.
App. 1995).
72. Id at 407.
73. Hill v. Douglass, 271 So. 2d 1, 1 (Fla. 1972).
74. 73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
75. Id at 399.
76. Id
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in representing all five family members caused compensatory dam-
ages.' Despite this lack of actual harm, however, the court found that
the lawyer's failure to disclose possible conflicting interests between
the parties justified a finding of breach of the fiduciary duty of loy-
alty.78 Citing cases relied on by section 49 of the Third Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers, the court held that clients need not
prove proximate causation and injury if they seek only fee forfeiture.7 9
This differing treatment of malpractice (tort) and breach of fiduci-
ary duty (agency) claims made sense to the court because each rem-
edy serves a different purpose. Compensatory damage in tort actions
"compensates clients for a harm they have suffered."' s Fee forfeiture,
on the other hand, serves the purpose of deterring attorney miscon-
duct, "a goal worth furthering regardless of whether a particular client
has been harmed."'" It also reflects "the decreased value of the repre-
sentation itself," and "fulfills a long-standing and fundamental princi-
ple of equity-that fiduciaries should not profit from theirdisloyalty."'
The Hendry court next addressed, as the Leslie Fay and Bonneville
Pacific courts did, the extent of the fee forfeiture.83 It left resolution
of that issue to a new trial, but held that the client's proof of the law-
yer's breach of fiduciary duty would provide a defense to the lawyer's
counterclaim for fees.' Presumably, this leaves the lawyer free to
bear the burden of establishing the value of the service rendered de-
spite the breach.
Similar outcomes have occurred in cases involving confidentiality
conflicts generated by former client representation. In one recent
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to disqualify a law firm
even though it had clearly violated Model Rule of Professional Con-
duct 1.9.85 Noting that the disqualification motion reached them on
the eve of trial and worried that a new lawyer might not be able to
master the complex technical details of the case, the court refused to
harm the current client by disqualifying his law firm. 6 The court con-
ditioned future representation, however, on the forfeiture of all future
fees. This was justified because of the failure of the law firm "to have
77. Id. at 401-02.
78. Id. at 402.
79. Id. (citing Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 1980); Gilchrist v.
Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1986)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 402.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 402-03.
84. Id. at 403.
85. See Dewey v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243, 250 (NJ. 1988).
86. Id. at 252.
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addressed the obvious ethical implications of their association that has
created the awkward situation now confronting us." 87
Other courts have shown similar nuance in applying fee forfeiture
to conflicts cases. In another recent case, the Oregon Supreme Court
approved a reduction of attorney's fees in a probate matter. 8 The
court documented no violation of a disciplinary rule and disapproved
of "direct sanction[s]" imposed by trial courts even when disciplinary
rules are violated by lawyers.8 9 Citing the Second Restatement of
Trusts section 243, which lists factors to be considered in assessing the
extent of fee forfeiture by a trustee who breaches a duty of loyalty, the
court upheld a reduction in the lawyer's fee that depleted the corpus
of the estate.90
The Minnesota Supreme Court has traveled the farthest in address-
ing the subtle, "dual nature of the fee forfeiture remedy." 91 On the
one hand, disgorging fees serves a remedial, reparative, purpose by
aiming "to make amends to the client" and putting right the fiduciary
relationship tainted by the conflict.92 On the other hand, fee forfei-
ture also serves a quasi-punitive purpose insofar as it deters breaches
of fiduciary duty. In this sense, the remedy is similar to nominal dam-
ages for breach of an "absolute right. '93 Because total fee forfeiture
"teaches a lesson," 94 insuring against a lawyer's personal forfeiture
has been held contrary to public policy. At the same time, policy ex-
clusions for fraudulent acts and punitive damages do not apply to fee
forfeiture for which the law firm is vicariously liable.15 Given this
midpoint between reparation and admonition, the court determined
the amount of the fee forfeiture by referring to the factors set out in
the state's punitive damage statute.96
87. Id
88. Kidney Ass'n v. Ferguson, 843 P.2d 442, 449 (Or. 1992) (en banc).
89. Id
90. Id The lawyer in Ferguson probably violated DR 5-101(A) by not disclosing
the extent of his personal interest in the fee charged the estate. The court correctly
rejected a DR 5-105 analysis, because the interest of the personal representative and
the beneficiary, who sought full fee disgorgement, coincided. Id.
91. Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1986).
92. Id
93. Id (citing Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.
1984)).
94. Id at 417.
95. Id at 415.
96. Id at 417 (relying on Minn. Stat. § 549.20(3) (1984)). Minnesota Statute
§ 549.20 reads in relevant part:
Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors which
justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the seriousness
of hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the profit-
ability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct
and any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the
hazard and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant
upon discovery of the misconduct, the number and level of employees in-
volved in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of
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These cases make sense. They appropriately address the lawyer's
failure to disclose a conflict and prevent harm to clients. Although
these same goals might be sought under the rubric of sanctions, with
analogies to disciplinary or Rule 11 standards, I agree with courts that
prefer the proportionality and appropriateness of fee forfeiture. Ex-
plicitly applying the forfeiture remedy to conflicts violations may be
especially important in state trial courts, where judges may be less ac-
customed to sanctions or disciplinary matters. Like the bankruptcy
courts in Leslie Fay and Bonneville Pacific, the state trial courts will
often have statutory or common law authority over attorneys fees.
Probate matters, such as the one in Kidney Association, and class ac-
tions, such as the underlying action in Gilchrist, require judicial super-
vision of fees. Fee issues can also arise in the context of a malpractice
suit by a disgruntled client, as in Hendry, or in a separate suit for pay-
ment or refund of fees, as in Jeffry. The judges in these cases felt quite
at ease recognizing fee forfeiture for breach of fiduciary duty as an
additional remedy in a conflicts case.97
Cases such as Dewey, Leslie Fay, and Bonneville Pacific illustrate
that the judiciary easily can renew this historically recognized remedy
in disqualification cases as well. Serious harm from conflicts viola-
tions can be redressed through disciplinary mechanisms, disqualifica-
tion motions, and malpractice suits. At the same time, the litigants'
major problem, the cost of counsel, also can be addressed by courts
themselves. I thank Professor Green for bringing this insight to our
attention. He has clarified my belief that it is time to dust off the fee
forfeiture remedy. He also has furthered Professor Wilkins's call for
multiple remedies when they reinforce lawyer compliance and trust.
the defendant, and the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including compensatory
and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated per-
sons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be
subject.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.20 (West 1988).
97. See, eg., Huffer v. Cicero, 667 N.E2d 1031 65 (Ohio CL App. 1995) (holding
criminal defense lawyer who failed to convey plea agreement to his client liable for
legal malpractice and ordered him to disgorge entire $16,000 attorney's fee).
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